

PERFORMANCE AUDIT
OF THE
BARAGA MAXIMUM CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
AND CAMP KITWEN

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

May 2001

EXECUTIVE DIGEST

BARAGA MAXIMUM CORRECTIONAL FACILITY AND CAMP KITWEN

INTRODUCTION	This report, issued in May 2001, contains the results of our performance audit* of the Baraga Maximum Correctional Facility (BMCF) and Camp Kitwen (CK), Department of Corrections (DOC).
AUDIT PURPOSE	This performance audit was conducted as part of the constitutional responsibility of the Office of the Auditor General. Performance audits are conducted on a priority basis related to the potential for improving effectiveness* and efficiency*.
BACKGROUND	<p>BMCF, located in Baraga County, and CK, located in Houghton County, are under the jurisdiction of DOC. The warden, who is the chief administrative officer for these facilities, is appointed by the DOC director.</p> <p>The two facilities share a records office, a personnel office, a business office, and a training office. The deputy warden oversees custody (safety and security), housing, training, and prisoner programs. The administrative officer oversees the business office, physical plant, warehouse, and food service operations.</p>

* See glossary at end of report for definition.

The mission* of these facilities is to protect the public by providing a safe, secure, and humane environment for staff and prisoners. BMCF, which originally opened in April 1993, is a multiple level facility for males with a capacity of 616 maximum security (level V)* and 240 minimum security (level I)* prisoners. The maximum security prisoners are housed in individual cells within a secured, double-fenced perimeter that includes motion detection systems, five gun towers, and an armed response vehicle that constantly patrols this portion of the facility perimeter. The minimum security prisoners at BMCF are housed in cubicles for six within a separate fenced perimeter. CK, which was placed under the jurisdiction of BMCF in September 1997, houses 240 minimum security (level I) male prisoners placed two to a cell within a secured, fenced perimeter.

For fiscal year 1999-2000, BMCF and CK operating expenditures were approximately \$25.8 million and \$3.8 million, respectively. As of September 30, 2000, BMCF and CK had 400 and 51 employees, respectively.

AUDIT OBJECTIVES
AND CONCLUSIONS

Audit Objective: To assess the effectiveness of BMCF's and CK's safety and security operations.

Conclusion: We concluded that BMCF's and CK's safety and security operations were generally effective. However, we noted reportable conditions* related to gate manifests*, security key controls, cell searches*, employee searches, firearms qualifications, the self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) squad, and the monitoring of prisoner phone calls (Findings 1 through 7).

* See glossary at end of report for definition.

Audit Objective: To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of BMCF's and CK's prisoner care and maintenance operations.

Conclusion: We concluded that BMCF's and CK's prisoner care and maintenance operations were generally effective and efficient. However, we noted a reportable condition related to fire evacuation drills. (Finding 8).

AUDIT SCOPE AND
METHODOLOGY

Our audit scope was to examine the program and other records of the Baraga Maximum Correctional Facility and Camp Kitwen. Our audit was conducted in accordance with *Government Auditing Standards* issued by the Comptroller General of the United States and, accordingly, included such tests of the records and such other auditing procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances.

Our audit procedures included examination of BMCF and CK records and activities for the period October 1998 through October 2000. Our audit methodology included a preliminary review of BMCF and CK operations. This included discussions with various BMCF and CK staff regarding their functions and responsibilities and a review of program records, DOC policy directives, and BMCF and CK operating procedures. To gain an understanding of BMCF and CK activities and to form a basis for selecting certain operations for audit, we conducted tests of records related to safety and security, prison operations, prisoner care, and maintenance activities for compliance with applicable policies and procedures and for program effectiveness and efficiency. In addition, we developed a survey (see supplemental information) requesting input from certain individuals and businesses regarding their association with the facilities.

AGENCY RESPONSES

Our audit report includes 8 findings and 8 corresponding recommendations. DOC's preliminary response indicated that BMCF and CK agree with all of the findings and either have complied or will comply with the recommendations.

May 9, 2001

Mr. Bill Martin, Director
Department of Corrections
Grandview Plaza
Lansing, Michigan

Dear Mr. Martin:

This is our report on the performance audit of the Baraga Maximum Correctional Facility and Camp Kitwen, Department of Corrections.

The report contains our executive digest; description of agency; audit objectives, scope, and methodology and agency responses; comments, findings, recommendations, and agency preliminary responses; description of survey and summary of survey responses, presented as supplemental information; and a glossary of acronyms and terms.

Our comments, findings, and recommendations are organized by audit objective. The agency preliminary responses were taken from the agency's responses subsequent to our audit fieldwork. The *Michigan Compiled Laws* and administrative procedures require that the audited agency develop a formal response within 60 days after release of the audit report.

We appreciate the courtesy and cooperation extended to us during this audit.

Sincerely,

Thomas H. McTavish, C.P.A.
Auditor General

This page left intentionally blank.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

BARAGA MAXIMUM CORRECTIONAL FACILITY AND CAMP KITWEN DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

INTRODUCTION

	<u>Page</u>
Executive Digest	1
Report Letter	5
Description of Agency	8
Audit Objectives, Scope, and Methodology and Agency Responses	9

COMMENTS, FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSES

Safety and Security Operations	11
1. Gate Manifests	11
2. Security Key Controls	13
3. Cell Searches	15
4. Employee Searches	15
5. Firearms Qualifications	17
6. SCBA Squad	18
7. Monitoring of Prisoner Phone Calls	19
Prisoner Care and Maintenance Operations	19
8. Fire Evacuation Drills	20

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Description of Survey	22
Summary of Survey Responses	23

GLOSSARY

Glossary of Acronyms and Terms	25
--------------------------------	----

Description of Agency

The Baraga Maximum Correctional Facility (BMCF), located in Baraga County, and Camp Kitwen (CK), located in Houghton County, are under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections (DOC). The warden, who is the chief administrative officer for these facilities, is appointed by the DOC director.

The two facilities share a records office, a personnel office, a business office, and a training office. The deputy warden oversees custody (safety and security), housing, training, and prisoner programs. The administrative officer oversees the business office, physical plant, warehouse, and food service operations.

The mission of these facilities is to protect the public by providing a safe, secure, and humane environment for staff and prisoners. BMCF, which originally opened in April 1993, is a multiple level facility for males with a capacity of 616 maximum security (level V) and 240 minimum security (level I) prisoners. The maximum security prisoners are housed in individual cells within a secured, double-fenced perimeter that includes motion detection systems, five gun towers, and an armed response vehicle that constantly patrols this portion of the facility perimeter. The minimum security prisoners at BMCF are housed in cubicles for six within a separate fenced perimeter. CK, which was placed under the jurisdiction of BMCF in September 1997, houses 240 minimum security (level I) male prisoners placed two to a cell within a secured, fenced perimeter.

For fiscal year 1999-2000, BMCF and CK operating expenditures were approximately \$25.8 million and \$3.8 million, respectively. As of September 30, 2000, BMCF and CK had 400 and 51 employees, respectively.

Audit Objectives, Scope, and Methodology and Agency Responses

Audit Objectives

Our performance audit of the Baraga Maximum Correctional Facility (BMCF) and Camp Kitwen (CK), Department of Corrections (DOC), had the following objectives:

1. To assess the effectiveness of BMCF's and CK's safety and security operations.
2. To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of BMCF's and CK's prisoner care and maintenance operations.

Audit Scope

Our audit scope was to examine the program and other records of the Baraga Maximum Correctional Facility and Camp Kitwen. Our audit was conducted in accordance with *Government Auditing Standards* issued by the Comptroller General of the United States and, accordingly, included such tests of the records and such other auditing procedures as we considered necessary in the circumstances.

Audit Methodology

Our audit procedures, conducted from July through October 2000, included examination of BMCF and CK records and activities for the period October 1998 through October 2000.

To establish our audit objectives and to gain an understanding of BMCF and CK activities, we conducted a preliminary review of BMCF and CK operations. This included discussions with various BMCF and CK staff regarding their functions and responsibilities and a review of program records, DOC policy directives, and BMCF and CK operating procedures. To gain an understanding of BMCF and CK activities and to form a basis for selecting certain operations for audit, we conducted tests of records related to safety and security, prison operations, prisoner care, and maintenance activities for compliance with applicable policies and procedures and for program effectiveness and efficiency.

To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of BMCF's and CK's safety and security operations, we conducted tests of records related to firearm inventories and employee

firearm qualifications. We also examined records related to prisoner shakedowns*, cell searches, and employee searches. On a test basis, we inventoried keys and critical and dangerous tools. In addition, we reviewed security monitoring* exercises, visitor safety, telephone monitoring systems, and documentation of items taken into and out of the facilities.

To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of BMCF and CK prisoner care and maintenance operations, we conducted tests of records and reviewed preventative maintenance, disaster management, inventory controls, fire safety procedures, emergency backup tests, food service operations, and prisoner care. Also, we analyzed prisoner store financial and inventory controls and reviewed controls over the prisoner funds accounting system.

In addition, we developed a survey (see supplemental information) requesting input from certain individuals and businesses regarding their association with the facilities.

Agency Responses

Our audit report includes 8 findings and 8 corresponding recommendations. DOC's preliminary response indicated that BMCF and CK agree with all of the findings and either have complied or will comply with the recommendations.

The agency preliminary response which follows each recommendation in our report was taken from the agency's written comments and oral discussions subsequent to our audit fieldwork. Section 18.1462 of the *Michigan Compiled Laws* and Department of Management and Budget Administrative Guide procedure 1280.02 require DOC to develop a formal response to our audit findings and recommendations within 60 days after release of the audit report.

* See glossary at end of report for definition.

COMMENTS, FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSES

SAFETY AND SECURITY OPERATIONS

COMMENT

Background: The Baraga Maximum Correctional Facility (BMCF) and Camp Kitwen (CK) operate under the policy directives established by the Department of Corrections (DOC) as well as operating procedures that were developed by BMCF. DOC policy directives and facility operating procedures have been implemented to help ensure the security of keys, tools, and firearms. BMCF and CK staff conduct periodic searches of prisoners, housing units, and prisoner belongings to detect contraband*. All visitors must register when entering the facilities and are subject to being searched. DOC policy directives provide for periodic random searches of employees entering and exiting the facilities.

Audit Objective: To assess the effectiveness of BMCF's and CK's safety and security operations.

Conclusion: We concluded that BMCF's and CK's safety and security operations were generally effective. However, we noted reportable conditions related to gate manifests, security key controls, cell searches, employee searches, firearms qualifications, the self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) squad, and the monitoring of prisoner phone calls.

FINDING

1. Gate Manifests

BMCF and CK did not effectively use or monitor gate manifests to ensure that the movement of critical and dangerous items into and out of the facilities was properly controlled.

BMCF operating procedure 04.04.110A requires the preparation of gate manifests. The gate manifests provide for extensive documentation of the movement of items

* See glossary at end of report for definition.

into and out of BMCF and CK. BMCF procedures also require gate officers to retain a copy of the gate manifest prior to the movement of items into the facilities to serve as a record to identify the items allowed into the facilities. Operating procedures further require the use of a numbering system to account for all manifests.

Our review of gate manifests from January 2, 2000 through January 8, 2000 and from April 16, 2000 through April 22, 2000 disclosed:

- a. BMCF gate officers allowed individuals who moved items, including critical and dangerous items, into the facility to retain all copies of the approved gate manifests. BMCF also did not account for the pressnumbered gate manifests after individuals returned from the facility. BMCF procedures require that gate manifests be filed in numerical sequence. However, we noted in our review that the sequence of used gate manifests was not consecutive.
- b. BMCF did not indicate that the dangerous or critical tools were removed from the facility for all 32 gate manifests reviewed that listed critical or dangerous tools. These tools included items such as hammers, chisels, a utility knife, screwdrivers, wrenches, and pry bars.
- c. BMCF did not ensure that CK properly controlled the movement of critical and dangerous items. BMCF became responsible for the operations of CK in September 1997. At the time of our review, CK did not have formal procedures in place relating to gate manifests. In addition, gate manifests were not being used to control the movement of critical and dangerous items entering and leaving the security perimeter.
- d. In some instances, BMCF did not fully complete the gate manifests. Eight (7%) out of 109 gate manifests were missing at least one of the following items: issue date, gate of passage, carrier signature, gate officer signature, origination of the item(s), and whether the item(s) was moving in or out of the facility.

Proper completion and verification of the numerical sequence of gate manifests issued would increase accountability over gate manifests and contribute to the safety of staff and prisoners. In addition, the effective use, monitoring, and

completion of gate manifests could reduce the risk of critical and dangerous items being left inside the facilities.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that BMCF and CK effectively use and monitor gate manifests to ensure that the movement of critical and dangerous items into and out of the facilities is properly controlled.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

BMCF and CK agree and informed us that they have taken steps to comply. BMCF informed us that operating procedure 04.04.110A is being revised to include a tracking system to ensure that the manifests are properly completed, signed, filed, and accounted for. At CK, a logbook has been established for documentation of gate manifests for the entry and departure of all critical and dangerous items entering and leaving the camp.

FINDING

2. Security Key Controls

BMCF and CK need to improve their controls over security keys.

DOC policy directive 04.04.100 and BMCF operating procedures require that security keys be accounted for during each shift. In addition, each facility is required to maintain a continuous, up-to-date key control system and to perform semiannual inventories of the facility keys, key blanks, and padlocks.

Our review of security keys and key blanks at BMCF and CK disclosed:

- a. CK did not document whether semiannual key inventories were conducted during our audit period. A complete physical inventory of security keys is required to be performed in January and July of each year.
- b. BMCF and CK did not document whether each shift performed an inventory of security keys, as required. Our review of the BMCF minimum security housing unit disclosed that documentation was not available to verify whether each shift performed an inventory of security keys for 10 (48%) of 21 shifts

reviewed. In addition, CK did not document whether key inventories were performed in 5 (17%) of 30 shifts reviewed.

- c. BMCF did not formally document the replacement of obsolete, broken, or worn keys to enable a reconciliation between key blanks received with the inventory of keys and key blanks on hand.
- d. CK did not maintain a continuous, up-to-date key control system. Our test of 12 key rings disclosed that in 3 (25%) cases the actual number of keys on the key ring did not agree with the number reported on the master key listing. We also noted that, in 2 (17%) cases, the tag on the key ring, which identifies the number of keys on the key ring, did not agree with the master key listing.

A key control system with proper controls and accountability is essential to help ensure the safety and security of staff and to reduce the possibility of prisoner escapes.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that BMCF and CK improve their controls over security keys.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

BMCF and CK agree and informed us that they have taken steps to comply. CK has added a page to the inventory manual to document the semiannual key audits, which are completed in January and July of each year. BMCF has established a system whereby each shift documents the daily key inventory for maximum and minimum units, and the documentation is forwarded to the Tool Control Office. BMCF has established an inventory logbook to document the replacement of obsolete, broken, or worn keys and the use of key blanks. A numbered key request form is used as a work order for this purpose and is kept on file. CK is currently checking all security key rings to ensure that they are correctly marked and on the master key listing. Also, the Morse Keywatch System is currently being implemented at BMCF and CK, which will enhance and document key control.

FINDING

3. Cell Searches

BMCF needs to ensure that housing unit officers* perform and properly document the required number of prisoner cell searches.

DOC policy directive 04.04.110 requires that each housing unit officer, assigned to first and second shifts, perform a minimum of three cell searches each day. The policy directive also requires that all cell searches be documented in a logbook. These searches are necessary to help detect prisoner contraband and to provide for the safety of staff and other prisoners.

Our review of selected cell search activity logbooks for a three-month period for two housing units disclosed that BMCF housing unit officers did not document whether 782 (18%) of the 4,368 required cell searches were performed.

Conducting the required number of prisoner cell searches gives BMCF assurance that contraband will be detected and confiscated in order to ensure the safety and security of staff and prisoners.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that BMCF ensure that housing unit officers perform and properly document the required number of prisoner cell searches.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

BMCF agrees and informed us that it will ensure that required cell searches are performed and documented.

FINDING

4. Employee Searches

BMCF needs to ensure that employee searches are conducted as required for employees entering the BMCF and CK security perimeters.

* See glossary at end of report for definition.

DOC policy directive 04.04.110 requires correctional facilities to establish the frequency of random employee searches of all employees entering a facility. BMCF issued a memorandum dated January 5, 2000 requiring the search at least once a month of all employees who normally enter the security perimeter. Also, we were informed by CK that it established an informal procedure to perform searches at least once a month of all employees entering the security perimeter.

Our review of BMCF and CK employee search logs disclosed:

- a. BMCF did not perform employee searches for 77 (93%) of 83 noncustody employees who normally entered the security perimeter on a daily basis during August 2000.
- b. CK did not perform employee searches for 43 (81%) of 53 employees, custody and noncustody, who normally entered the security perimeter on a daily basis during June 2000.

Random searches of employees who routinely work inside the security perimeter can be an effective deterrent to contraband entering the facility. DOC has informed us that it is in the process of developing an updated policy to ensure random searches of employees.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that BMCF ensure that employee searches are conducted as required for employees entering the BMCF and CK security perimeters.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

DOC agrees with this finding and intends to enhance its employee search policy directive by requiring searches of employees based on computer-generated random samples.

FINDING

5. Firearms Qualifications

BMCF needs to ensure that all custody officers* obtain annual recertification in the use of the firearms required for their positions.

DOC policy directive 03.03.100 requires that custody officers must be recertified annually in the use of handguns, shotguns, or rifles prior to being issued these firearms. Custody officers who may be assigned to the mobilization squad, emergency response team, gun tower, perimeter security vehicle, or transportation detail must be annually recertified in the use of the firearms required for the assignments.

Our review of custody training records and assignments for three days during September 2000 disclosed that shift commanders assigned four custody officers to four assignments that could have required the use of a firearm for which the officers had not been annually recertified. We noted that the time lapse for the period without recertification ranged from 38 to 71 days.

Proper maintenance of firearms certifications for all assignments is essential to help ensure the safety and security of staff and prisoners.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that BMCF ensure that all custody officers obtain annual recertification in the use of the firearms required for their positions.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

BMCF agrees and informed us that it will comply. BMCF informed us that each shift commander will use the most recent Disturbance Control Qualification List (updated monthly) when making daily custody assignments to ensure that only qualified staff are assigned to such assignments. The BMCF institutional training officer maintains this list and will make sure that staff requiring the use of a firearm are recertified on an annual basis before their certification expires.

* See glossary at end of report for definition.

FINDING

6. SCBA Squad

BMCF needs to ensure that all custody officers are qualified in the use of SCBA equipment prior to assignment to the SCBA squad.

DOC policy directive 04.03.120 requires that there be five SCBA qualified staff on duty and available for response on each shift. SCBA equipment is used by staff for respiratory protection when they must assist with the evacuation of prisoners from a smoke-contaminated area.

Our review of SCBA qualification records of custody officers assigned to the SCBA squad for 30 assignments during a three-day period disclosed that 4 officers assigned to four assignments were not qualified. We determined that 3 of the officers did not receive the required training. In addition, 1 officer was not medically cleared to enable assignment to the SCBA squad.

By not assigning qualified staff to SCBA squads, BMCF could compromise the safety of staff and prisoners during rescue attempts from smoke-contaminated areas.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that BMCF ensure that all custody officers are qualified in the use of SCBA equipment prior to assignment to the SCBA squad.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

BMCF agrees and informed us that it has taken steps to ensure that only qualified, medically cleared staff are assigned to the five positions for the SCBA squad on each shift. Each shift commander will use the most recent Disturbance Control Qualification List when making daily assignments to the SCBA squad. The BMCF institutional training officer maintains this list and will ensure that staff assigned to positions on the SCBA squad are qualified and medically cleared.

FINDING

7. Monitoring of Prisoner Phone Calls

BMCF needs to ensure that CK monitors and documents its monitoring of the required number of prisoner phone calls and/or taped phone conversations per month.

DOC policy directive 05.03.130 requires that each institution perform and document the monitoring of at least 50 prisoner phone calls or taped phone conversations per month. Designated staff are to randomly listen to prisoner phone calls or review taped phone conversations of those prisoners suspected of illegal activity.

CK did not document whether it performed any monitoring of prisoner phone calls and/or taped phone conversations during our audit period. CK informed us that monitoring was done but that it did not document the activity conducted.

Random and selective monitoring of prisoner phone calls or taped phone conversations can be an effective deterrent to contraband entering the institution and can aid in identification of other illegal activities.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that BMCF ensure that CK monitors and documents its monitoring of the required number of prisoner phone calls and/or taped phone conversations per month.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

BMCF agrees and informed us that it has taken steps to ensure that the required number of prisoner phone calls are monitored at CK on a monthly basis. CK started a logbook in November 2000 which documents that the required number of calls (50) are being monitored by staff.

PRISONER CARE AND MAINTENANCE OPERATIONS

COMMENT

Background: BMCF and CK are responsible for providing a safe, secure, and humane environment for staff and prisoners. BMCF and CK have developed procedures

involving preventative maintenance, disaster planning, fire safety, food service activities, prisoner accounting, and prisoner store operations.

Audit Objective: To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of BMCF's and CK's prisoner care and maintenance operations.

Conclusion: We concluded that BMCF's and CK's prisoner care and maintenance operations were generally effective and efficient. However, we noted a reportable condition related to fire evacuation drills.

FINDING

8. Fire Evacuation Drills

BMCF needs to ensure that CK conducts fire evacuation drills quarterly on each shift.

DOC policy directive 04.03.120 requires that fire evacuation drills be held quarterly in all locations that are normally occupied by staff or prisoners. The policy directive also requires that the fire evacuation drills be conducted on all shifts.

Our review of fire evacuation drills conducted for a one-year period at CK disclosed that CK did not conduct 3 (25%) of 12 required drills.

Conducting all required fire evacuation drills increases the likelihood that evacuation procedures are fully understood by staff and prisoners to ensure their safety during emergencies.

RECOMMENDATION

We recommend that BMCF ensure that CK conducts fire evacuation drills quarterly on each shift.

AGENCY PRELIMINARY RESPONSE

BMCF agrees and informed us that it has taken steps to ensure that fire evacuation drills are held quarterly at CK on each shift. The fire safety inspector has set up a schedule to monitor CK to ensure that all required drills are held. Each drill is documented in the control center logbook and also on a fire drill evacuation report.

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

Description of Survey

We developed a survey requesting input from certain individuals and businesses regarding their association with the Baraga Maximum Correctional Facility (BMCF) and Camp Kitwen (CK).

We mailed surveys to 50 individuals and businesses located in the vicinity of BMCF and received 19 responses. A review of these responses indicated that most respondents were highly satisfied or had no opinion regarding the BMCF administration. The responses did indicate concerns about the use of the shooting range in the early hours of the morning. We referred these concerns to the warden for follow-up and provided him with a summary of the survey information.

We also mailed surveys to 50 individuals and businesses located in the vicinity of CK and received 34 responses. A review of the responses indicated that most respondents were highly satisfied or had no opinion regarding the CK administration. We provided a summary of the survey information to the warden.

BARAGA MAXIMUM CORRECTIONAL FACILITY (BMCF) AND CAMP KITWEN (CK)

Department of Corrections
Summary of Survey Responses

Copies of survey distributed at each location: 50

BMCF: Number of responses 19 Response rate 38%

CK: Number of responses 34 Response rate 68%

1. How would you rate your satisfaction with the frequency of communication between you or your organization and the Baraga Maximum Correctional Facility or Camp Kitwen?

	<u>Highly Satisfied</u>	<u>Somewhat Satisfied</u>	<u>Somewhat Dissatisfied</u>	<u>Highly Dissatisfied</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>	<u>No Answer</u>
BMCF	12	1	1	1	3	1
CK	28	3	0	0	3	0

2. Have you expressed any concern to the facility regarding its operations?

BMCF	Yes: 5	No: 14	No Answer: 0
CK	Yes: 0	No: 34	No Answer: 0

- a. If yes, how satisfied were you with how management of the Baraga Maximum Correctional Facility or Camp Kitwen addressed your individual concerns?

	<u>Highly Satisfied</u>	<u>Somewhat Satisfied</u>	<u>Somewhat Dissatisfied</u>	<u>Highly Dissatisfied</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>	<u>No Answer</u>
BMCF	3	2	1	0	4	9
CK	8	0	0	0	2	24

- b. How satisfied were you with the timeliness in which your individual concerns were addressed by the Baraga Maximum Correctional Facility or Camp Kitwen?

	<u>Highly Satisfied</u>	<u>Somewhat Satisfied</u>	<u>Somewhat Dissatisfied</u>	<u>Highly Dissatisfied</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>	<u>No Answer</u>
BMCF	4	2	1	0	5	7
CK	13	0	0	0	4	17

- c. Do you have any specific safety or security concerns that have not been addressed by Baraga Maximum Correctional Facility or Camp Kitwen personnel?

BMCF	Yes:	0	No:	14	No Answer:	5
CK	Yes:	1	No:	23	No Answer:	10

3. If you have visited the Baraga Maximum Correctional Facility or Camp Kitwen, were you satisfied with the security provided to you while at the facility?

	<u>Highly Satisfied</u>	<u>Somewhat Satisfied</u>	<u>Somewhat Dissatisfied</u>	<u>Highly Dissatisfied</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>	<u>No Answer</u>
BMCF	13	0	0	0	6	0
CK	21	0	0	0	12	1

4. Overall, how satisfied are you with the communication between the Baraga Maximum Correctional Facility or Camp Kitwen and the community?

	<u>Highly Satisfied</u>	<u>Somewhat Satisfied</u>	<u>Somewhat Dissatisfied</u>	<u>Highly Dissatisfied</u>	<u>No Opinion</u>	<u>No Answer</u>
BMCF	12	2	1	1	2	1
CK	27	3	0	0	4	0

Glossary of Acronyms and Terms

BMCF	Baraga Maximum Correctional Facility. (Note that DOC uses AMF as the acronym for the Baraga Maximum Correctional Facility.)
cell search	The act of going through a prisoner's cell and belongings looking for contraband.
CK	Camp Kitwen.
contraband	Property that is not allowed on facility grounds or in visiting rooms by State law, rule, or DOC policy. For prisoners, this includes any property that they are not specifically authorized to possess, authorized property in excessive amounts, or authorized property that has been altered without permission.
custody officer	A corrections officer who is assigned to a facility.
DOC	Department of Corrections.
effectiveness	Program success in achieving mission and goals.
efficiency	Achieving the most outputs and outcomes practical for the amount of resources applied or minimizing the amount of resources required to attain a certain level of outputs or outcomes.
gate manifest	A record used to control materials and supplies entering and leaving a facility through the front gates and sallyport.
housing unit officer	A corrections officer who works in the housing units.

maximum security (level V)	A classification for prisoners who need close supervision because of the likelihood they may try to escape or because they are difficult to control.
minimum security (level I)	A classification for prisoners who can live in facilities with a minimum amount of security. They are normally relatively near parole.
mission	The agency's main purpose or the reason that the agency was established.
performance audit	An economy and efficiency audit or a program audit that is designed to provide an independent assessment of the performance of a governmental entity, program, activity, or function to improve public accountability and to facilitate decision making by parties responsible for overseeing or initiating corrective action.
reportable condition	A matter coming to the auditor's attention that, in the auditor's judgment, should be communicated because it represents either an opportunity for improvement or a significant deficiency in management's ability to operate a program in an effective and efficient manner.
SCBA	self-contained breathing apparatus.
security monitoring	A systematic method of safely and effectively testing and monitoring security standards of a facility to enable staff to have an opportunity to practice the standards under controlled conditions.
shakedown	The act of searching a prisoner, an employee, or a visitor to ensure that he/she does not have any contraband in his/her possession.